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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Warren L. Mengis*
Surely the most significant case decided within the past year in the
field of professional responsibility is Leenerts Farms v. Rogers.' As stated
by Justice Marcus, who wrote the opinion, the sole issue presented for
determination was whether the courts may inquire into the reasonableness
of attorney's fees which have been fixed in a note by the parties as a
percentage of the amount due upon default of the debtor. In deciding
this rather limited question the court has opened a veritable Pandora's
box of questions, some of which will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive law review articles. Those who are concerned with the Louisiana
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was recognized as having the
force and effect of substantive law in Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products,2
should be intensely interested in the court's further characterization of
the Code. Louisiana Civil Code article 11 states in part that "[i]ndividuals
can not by their conventions, derogate from the force of laws made for
the preservation of public order or good morals." The court linked this
article with the Code of Professional Responsibility and said: "We view
the Code of Professional Responsibility as being the most exacting of laws
established for the public good. Hence, the prohibition against a lawyer
collecting a 'clearly excessive fee' cannot be abrogated by a provision in
a note fixing the amount of attorney fees as a percentage of the amount
to be collected." 3 The court stressed its duty to assert the authority conferred upon it by the Louisiana Constitution to regulate the practice of law.
The constitutional separation of powers together with the forceful pronouncements in Saucier and Leenerts Farms throw into immediate doubt
the constitutionality of Act 483 of the Regular Session of 1983. This is
apparently a legislative attempt to overrule Leenerts by adding to Civil
Code article 1935 the following language: "But where the parties, by contract in writing, have expressly agreed that the debtor shall also be liable
for the creditor's attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the
creditor is entitled to that amount as well." As attorneys' fees preoccupied the courts' attention more than usual in the past term, this article
will discuss that subject in more detail hereafter.
DIsCIPLINE

Twelve disciplinary proceedings were reported during the past year.
In the majority of these cases, suspensions for periods ranging from six
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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months to three years were given; 4 in two cases, public reprimands were
given;5 and two attorneys were ordered disbarred. 6 In LSBA v. Armagnac,7
the respondent was charged with receiving succession funds for his client,
failing to disburse them, comingling the funds with his own and converting over $15,500 of the funds to his own use. The commissioner recommended suspension for six months, but the Committee on Professional
Responsibility disagreed with the recommendation for such leniency as
inappropriate for such serious violations of the Code of Professional
Responsiblity. The court agreed with the committee, stating that violations of disciplinary rule 9-102AI are of the most serious nature, and that
the misuse of a client's funds by an attorney represents the gravest form
of professional misconduct. Disbarment was ordered. In LSBA v. Whiting,9
a federal conviction of the respondent on four counts of mail fraud served
as the basis for the committee's petition to disbar. Although the convictions were in the year 1961, they did not come to the attention of the
Committee on Professional Responsiblity until 1972. A suspension was
ordered at that time and in 1974, the committee filed its petition for
suspension or disbarment. Unfortunately, another delay occurred because
the respondent could not be located, and no service was made nor was
issue joined until January 1982. The court concluded that mail fraud was
a serious crime involving moral turpitude and further found that the long
delay, which ordinarily could be considered a mitigating circumstance,
was not persuasive in this case because respondent's activities and involvements since the 1964 conviction confirmed that he was still morally
unfit to enjoy the privilege of practicing law. Disbarment was ordered.
An extensive delay between the complaint and the resulting disciplinary
proceedings in LSBA v. Dayel resulted in a three-year suspension, rather
than a possible disbarment, for misappropriating a client's funds. Full
restitution had been made, and it was an isolated incident. Respondent
had subsequently regained the respect of his community and was active
in religious, civic and professional circles. The court concluded that conversion of a client's funds is not only professionally unethical but also
4. LSBA v. Orpys, 427 So. 2d 842 (La. 1983); LSBA v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406 (La.
1983); LSBA v. Thompson, 427 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1983); LSBA v. Daye, 427 So. 2d 840
(La. 1983); LSBA v. Bubert, 421 So. 2d 831 (La. 1982); LSBA v. Kramer, 426 So. 2d 1110
(La. 1982); LSBA v. Cannon, 427 So. 2d 827 (La. 1983).
5. LSBA v. Mundy, 423 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1982); LSBA v. Weinstein, 416 So. 2d
62 (La. 1982).
6. LSBA v. Whiting, 425 So. 2d 725 (La. 1983); LSBA v. Armagnac, 424 So. 2d
996 (La. 1982).
7. 424 So. 2d 996 (La. 1982).
8. LA. CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 9-102 (found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LA.
STATE BAR ASS'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. tit. 37, ch. 4, app. (1974 & Supp. 1983)) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF PROF. REsP.]
9. 425 So. 2d 725 (La. 1983).
10. 427 So. 2d 840 (La. 1983).
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illegal and morally reprehensible, and it is the type of violation that strikes
at the very heart of public confidence in the legal profession. Accordingly, a. lengthy suspension was deemed appropriate.
In LSBA v. Karst," the respondent was charged with violation of
disciplinary rule 8-102(B), making false accusations against a judge, and
disciplinary rule 1-102, engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice and engaging in other conduct that adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law. According to the committee's
specification, Mr. Karst had been involved in a civil suit in which he was
the defendant, and having been cast in judgment by Judge Guy E. Humphries, Jr., thereafter publicly accused Judge Humphries of being dishonest, corrupt and engaging in fraud and misconduct. The supreme court
took this opportunity to reiterate the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings and the way the court decides upon what sanction to impose.
According to the court, the purpose of such proceeding is
to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct in order
to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers
who have demonstrated in their conduct that they are unable or
likely to be unable to discharge their professional duties ...
[T]he discipline to be imposed in a particular case will depend
upon the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, fashioned
in light of the purpose of lawyer discipline taking into account
aggravating and mitigating circumstances."
Considering that the matter in which Mr. Karst was involved could cause
his financial ruin and while at the same time being mindful of the "serious
nature of respondent's unwarranted and baseless conduct and its prejudicial
effect on the legal profession,"' 3 the court imposed a suspension of one
year.
MALPRACTICE

It is an unpleasant fact of life that attorney malpractice cases are
becoming more prevalent. Letting a claim prescribe or failing to take some
other action timely on behalf of a client is one of the prime causes for
such actions. It is fairly open and shut in such a case that the attorney
was negligent, and the only real question to be decided is what loss the
client has suffered. More difficult are those cases in which the attorney
is charged with falling below the standard of care, skill and diligence which
an attorney is obligated to exercise in his handling of a client's affairs.
Canon 6 of the Louisiana Code of Professional Responsibility states that

11. 428 So. 2d 406 (La. 1983).
12. 428 So. 2d at 411.
13. Id.
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a lawyer should represent a client competently, and disciplinary rule 6-101
provides that a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter which he knows
or should know that he is not competent to handle without associating
with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. Nor shall an attorney
handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances,
and further he shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. So far,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has not used the Code as a set of malpractice rules, but has formulated the general standard that an attorney "is
obligated to exercise at least that degree of care, skill, and diligence which
is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality.""
In Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., ' the Louisiana
Supreme Court was confronted with the first type of malpractice action
in which the attorneys negligently failed to file suit until two days after
prescription had run, and the majority followed the "case within a case"
method in order to determine what loss if any the client had suffered.
This method requires that the client's case be actually tried in a full blown
adversary setting. If the client is successful in recovering a judgment, the
negligent attorney is responsible for that amount. To satisfy the burden
of proof imposed prior to Jenkins, the plaintiff not only had to prove
that the attorney was negligent in handling his client's claim or litigation,
but also that the claim or litigation would have been successful, but for
the attorney's negligence.' 6 In other words, the burden was entirely on
the client. In Jenkins, with Justice Lemmon writing the majority opinion,
the burden of proof was shifted from the client to the attorney once the
client had established negligence on the part of the attorney. Once
negligence is established, which is usually a simple matter when the attorney has failed to file a claim before prescription or to take a timely
appeal, the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome a client's
prima facie case by proving that the client could not have succeeded on
the original claim falls upon the attorney.
Jenkins involved a truck-train collision, and contributory negligence
of the plaintiff was the attorneys' main contention. This being so, Justice
Watson, in dissent, found the shift in burden of proof had no significance
since, in this case, the negligent attorneys already had that burden. Justice
Dennis also dissented; although he commended the plurality for improving the law by modifying the case within a case requirement, he would
go one step further and jettison the case within the case requirement.
He argued that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for the loss
14. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239,
244 (1972).
15. 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982).
16. See, e.g., King v. Fourchy, 47 La. Ann. 354, 16 So. 814 (1895); Lewis v. Collins,
260 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So. 2d 723 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied.
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of his claim, which certainly had some value, regardless of whether he
triumphed in a full scale hypothetical trial. Justice Dennis pointed out
that an award of damages based upon a reasonable settlement value has
considerable logical appeal.
Davis v. United Parcel Service 7 holds that the decision in Jenkins
is retroactive because the burden of proof rule is procedural. In Davis,
the attorney had failed to file a workmen's compensation claim on behalf
of his client even though he had knowledge of some disfigurement of
the client, i.e., a small scar over the left forehead region. The case within
a case requirement was followed by 'the trial court, and the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the defendant attorney and his insurer. However,
the trial court had instructed the jury concerning the burden of proof
in accordance with the rule adhered to prior to Jenkins. In addition, the
interrogatories submitted to the jury were confusing and could not properly serve as a basis for a judgment either for or against the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the third circuit reviewed all of the evidence and concluded
that there was no compensable workmen's compensation injury.
In the second type of malpractice case, in which the attorney has
simply mishandled his client's affairs, the court should not have too much
difficulty in determining the loss suffered by the client. Apparently, the
client would have the burden of proving not only the negligence of the
attorney but also the amount of damage.
A conflict of authority in the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has now been cleared up by the decision in Cherokee Restaurant
v. Pierson. 8 In this forum last year, 9 the conflict between Jackson v.
Zito"0 and Vessel v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.2 was pointed
out. In Cherokee, the first circuit, sitting en banc, held that a malpractice action against an attorney is normally subject to a one-year prescriptive period, and only when an attorney breaches an express warranty of
result does an action for breach of contract, which prescribes in ten years,
arise against him. Jackson was expressly overruled in so far as it recognized
a ten-year prescriptive period for the "negligent breach of contract" by
an attorney.
Judge Ponder's dissenting opinion in Cherokee brings up the question of just what the relationship between an attorney and his client is.
The Code of Professional Responsibility says it is a personal, unique,
fiduciary relationship. The Louisiana Supreme Court has on many occa17.
18.
19.

427 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 773 (1983).
Mengis, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-ProfessionalResponsibility, 43 LA.
L. REV. 555 (1982).
20. 314 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
21. 276 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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sions said that the relationship is one of mandate or agency, thus permitting the client to discharge the attorney at will. However, it is not at
all difficult to visualize the attorney as an independent contractor who
undertakes a certain piece of legal work for a certain fee, usually without
any warranty as to results. If the courts adhere to the agency or mandate
theory, it would appear that Judge Ponder is correct in his assertion that
the opinion effectively eliminates contractual claims against attorneys in
the ordinary case. The writer does not see this as a bad result, however,
because the alternative of a ten-year prescriptive period in the ordinary
malpractice case is certainly too long, and there seems to be no societal
reason for giving a client more than one year after he discovers the injury within which to bring his lawsuit. Even in the case of an express
warranty or of the guaranty of a title opinion, there does not seem to
be any good reason to have such a long prescriptive period. A simple
solution would be a legislative act fixing a period of one year or perhaps
two years from the negligent act or from the discovery of the negligent
act by the client within which to bring suit.
. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Only one case involving a possible conflict of interest was decided
in the state courts, namely State v. Bosworth.22 The defendant in Bosworth
contended that his prior attorney had had an irreconcilable conflict of
interest in" that the attorney had previously represented a potential prosecution witness in the same matter. The Louisiana Supreme Court found
that no conflict had actually existed because, at the time the attorney
began his representation, the accused had already admitted commission
of the acts and had no intention of going to trial. In a footnote,2" the
court discusses the holdings of the United States Supreme Court case of
Cuyler v. Sullivan2" and the federal Sixth Circuit case of Smith v.
Bordenkircher.25 As interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, the Cuyler decision
directs the lower courts to determine, on the facts of each case, whether
there was an actual conflict of interest and whether that conflict had caused
ineffective performance in a situation where the accused's present attorney
also represented a prosecution witness at a prior time. In other words,
there is no per se disqualification.
ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL

It is now conceded that defendants in criminal trials are entitled to
effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United
22. 415 So. 2d 912 (La. 1982).

23.
24.

Id. at 925 n.15.
446 U.S. 335 (1980).

25.

671 F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1982).
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States Constitution. However, what constitutes effective assistance has been
the subject of much disagreement and many opinions. For instance, in
United States v. Decoster,2 6 there were four long opinions, a short statement by Judge Wright, and no majority opinion. The latest expression
of the United States Supreme Court is simply that the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney."
The federal Fifth Circuit has been fairly consistent in requiring representation by an attorney "reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance." 28 Louisiana has basically followed the same standard as set forth in State v. Myles,29 State v. Ratcliff,3 ° State v. Felde,3 '
and State v. Seiss."
In State v. Berry,33 the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a two-step
inquiry. The first step is to determine whether counsel has violated a duty
to his client, for example, by failing to prepare for trial. If so, the second inquiry is whether the violation has resulted in prejudice to the defense
of the case. The initial burden of proof is on the defendant, but once
met, he is entitled to a new trial unless the court can say beyond a
reasonable doubt the error was harmless. Justice Dennis, in concurrence,
agreed that the two-step inquiry is appropriate for use in resolving claims
of ineffective assistance grounded in lack of trial preparation, but he concluded that the second inquiry represents too stringent a burden to be
placed fairly upon a defendant for other types of ineffective assistance
claims. It can be readily foreseen that convicted defendants will continue
to raise the question of effective assistance of counsel in writs of habeas
corpus, despite the clarification of the meaning of "effective assistance."
In State v. Brooks,34 the second circuit held that a criminal defendant's right to counsel of his choice is a right that must be exercised at
a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, and at an appropriate stage
of the proceeding. The defendant, although arraigned in March 1982, and
advised that she would be tried in October, did not obtain counsel until
the 10th or llth of October, and her new attorney immediately filed a
motion for a continuance which was denied by the trial judge. The court
held that "[a]bsent a justifiable basis, there is no constitutional right to
change counsel on the day of trial with the attendant necessity of a continuance and its disrupting implications." 3 "The right to counsel of choice
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1981).
389 So. 2d 12 (La. 1980) (on rehearing).
416 So. 2d 528 (La. 1982).
422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
428 So. 2d 444 (La. 1983).
430 So. 2d 1005 (La. 1983).
431 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 868.
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cannot be manipulated to obstruct orderly procedure in the courts or to
impair the fair administration of criminal justice." 3"
It was clear in Brooks that the delay in obtaining counsel was the
fault of the defendant, whereas in State v. Weisenbaker37 the defendant
ended up without a lawyer on the day of the trial because of an apparent
mix-up between out-of-state counsel and local counsel. The defendant in
Weisenbaker requested additional time to obtain counsel, but the trial court
denied the continuance and ordered the defendant to trial without counsel.
Thereafter, defendant was convicted of a nine-count theft indictment and
subsequently sentenced to serve a total of nine years imprisonment at hard
labor and pay fines totaling $9000. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that if counsel and
not defendant was at fault for counsel's failure to appear or to give timely
notice to the trial court of a conflict in schedule, sanctions must be taken
against counsel and not the defendant.
In an interesting case out of the fourth circuit," the court affirmed
a money judgment against the State of Louisiana for attorney's fees
awarded to an attorney appointed to represent a child in an abandonment proceeding. The court relied on dicta from State v. Campbell" to
buttress its holding. Judge Schott in concurrence concluded that the
legislature by not providing a statutory device for compensating the attorney, whose services it had required by statute, authorized "extraordinary
judicial measures" in the form of a money judgment against the state
for the fee of the attorney.
ATTORNEYS'

FEES

Suppose an attorney and a successful businessman enter into a contract under which the attorney will handle a particular legal matter for

the businessman at the rate of one hundred dollars per hour, or that an
attorney who is well known for his representation of persons accused of
a crime agrees to represent a mature, competent individual who is accused of a felony for a fee of $15,000, or finally that a competent
businessman signs a promissory note in favor of XYZ Bank, the note

containing an attorney fee provision set at twenty percent of the amount
in suit. In any of these cases, should the courts have anything whatsoever
to say about the reasonableness of the fee? It is beyond argument that
the client in the first two suppositions may discharge his lawyer with or
without cause at anytime he sees fit.' Taking the first supposition and

36.
37.
38.

Id.
428 So. 2d 790 (La. 1983).
In re Lamm, 423 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).

39.

324 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975).

40.

CODE OF PROF. RESP.

DR 2-110(B)(4), supra note 8; Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So.
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assuming further that the client discharged the lawyer after twenty hours
of work, is there any reason to hold that the fee provision in the contract
would not govern the amount owed the attorney? After all, Saucier v.
t
Hayes Dairy Products"
holds that the amount provided "in the contingency fee contract, not quantum meruit, is the proper frame of reference
for fixing compensation for the attorney prematurely discharged without
cause." ' Should the court have the right to review the reasonableness
of the hourly amount which had been agreed to between the parties? In
the second supposition, assuming that all of the work was done, should
the client have the right upon being sued by the attorney for his fee to
contest the reasonableness thereof?
In the recent case of Hebert v. Neyrey,"3 the first circuit summarized
the law concerning contractual attorney's fees.
The prevailing party in litigation is not entitled to the award of
an attorney fee unless it is authorized by statute or contract.
Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories"". . . . Parties to a contract
may lawfully obligate themselves for the payment of an attorney
fee, Maloney v. Oak Builders"5 . . . subject to review and control
by the courts. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products"' . .. Although
a written agreement may provide for a specified attorney fee, the
court may inquire into the reasonableness of the fee. Leenerts
Farms, Inc. v. Rogers"7 ....
In Watson v. Cook, "8 the second circuit, citing Saucier stated that
its review of the jurisprudence led it to conclude that any dispute relative
to an attorney/client relationship (including the enforcement of the contract sought to be enforced in the case at bar) is subject to the close
scrutiny of the courts, and is to be resolved under the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The court wrote:
Therefore, it is clear that although parties are permitted to contract and/or agree with respect to attorney's fees, . . . attorney's
fees and all contracts and agreements pertaining to such fees are
subject to the review and control of the courts. . . . The collec-

2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Krebs v. Bailey's Equip. Rental, 328 So. 2d 775 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976).
41. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
42. Id. at 118.
43. 432 So. 2d 396, 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (emphasis and footnotes added) (cita-

tions omitted).
44. 359 So.
45. 256 La.
46. 373 So.
47. 421 So.
48. 427 So.

2d
85,
2d
2d
2d

1275 (La. 1978).
235 So. 2d 386 (1970).
102 (La. 1979).
216 (La. 1982).
1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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tion of excessive fees for which no commensurate service is per49
formed is not vouchsafed by law.
In a companion case in the same circuit, City of Shreveport v. Standard Printing Co.,50 the court was faced with a stipulation between parties
to the effect that if Standard Printing Co. was awarded attorney's fees,
twenty-five percent of its recovery in excess of the city's final offer of
$165,000 would be reasonable. A fee calculated in accordance with the
stipulation would have been a little bit over $100,000, but the trial court
only awarded $80,000. The appellate court, citing Leenerts Farms, held
that even when parties purport to fix the amount of an attorney's fee
by Contract, the courts may still inquire into the reasonableness of that
fee. The court affirmed the trial court's award and granted an extra $2000
for services rendered in connection with the appeal.
The courts have further held that once the client has exercised his
right to terminate the contract, whether in writing or otherwise, the fee
provisions of the contract then become unenforceable and the attorney's
only claim is in quantum meruit.1' So it can be seen that the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides legislative acts which tend to impede
or frustrate it (Saucier)and also overrides the deliberate contractual provisions of persons of equal bargaining power (Leenerts Farms).
It was indicated in the introduction to this article that Leenerts Farms
is a most important decision which poses many unanswered questions.
In that case, Leenerts Farms paid attorney's fees of $72,755 along with
the principal and interest, and the sole question to be decided was whether
or not the courts may inquire into the reasonableness of attorney's fees
which are fixed in the note by the parties as a percentage of the amount
due upon default of the debtor. In order to arrive at the conclusion that
the courts do have such authority, the court had to and did overrule the
old Louisiana Supreme Court case of W. K. Henderson Iron Works &
Supply Co. v. Meriwether Supply Co.2 The court thus approved the fourth
circuit decision in People's National Bank v. Smith53 and disapproved a
first circuit decision in Fidelity National Bank v. Pitchford."' Although
Justice Marcus, writing for the majority in Leenerts Farms, said that the
attorney's fee provision was not a stipulation for the payment of liquidated
damages, he did not say what it was, nor did he say in whose favor the

49. Id. at 1316 (citations omitted).
50. 427 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
51. Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Simon, Come & Block
v. Duke, 429 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
52. 178 La. 516, 152 So. 69 (1934).
53. 360 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
54. 374 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
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stipulation runs. It would be inappropriate in this article to go into any
great detail in considering the questions which attorneys are asking
themselves, but the following should be considered: if the stipulation runs
in favor of the holder of the note, which apparently has been the law
since 1878,1 5 is the holder of the note (a) practicing law, (b) obligated
to pay the entire fee to an attorney, and/or (c) capable of using it as
a set-off? On the other hand, if the stipulation runs in favor of the attorney, may the holder independently sue for the attorney's fees or must
the attorney intervene, and if he must intervene, is he violating canon
5 by acquiring an interest in the lawsuit? These and other questions, including the constitutionality of Act 483 of 1983, will be considered in
a note to be published in an upcoming issue of the Louisiana Law Review.
In the meantime, the lower courts are not hesitating to adjust attorneys' fees considered excessive under the circumstances. In McCarthy
v. Louisiana Timeshare Venture,56 a fourth circuit decision, a promissory
note allegedly defaulted upon was turned over for collection to the attorney who then made a demand upon the maker which included attorney's
fees of $42,500. The maker immediately responded by offering to pay
the principal and interest but declined to pay the $42,500 and proposed
a $1,000 fee instead. The attorney then proceeded by executory process
in an attempt to collect the full amount. A subsequent offer to pay attorney's fees of $10,000 was also rejected by the attorney. After negotiation and by agreement the executory process matter was recalled and the
note was assigned by the plaintiff to a third party, but the questions of
a prepayment penalty and the amount of attorney's fees were reserved
and litigated. As to the former, the court held that an accelerating creditor
can not demand a prepayment penalty inasmuch as the note itself contemplated such a penalty only when the option to prepay was elected by
the maker of the note. As to the latter, the court held that although the
creditor was entitled to demand attorney's fees once the suit was filed,
the fee must be commensurate with counsel's legal skills, the complexity
of the litigation, time expended and results achieved; the setting of a
percentage in the promissory note did not bar the court from inquiring
into the reasonableness of the fee. The matter was remanded to the trial
court to determine the amount of attorney's fees.
The first circuit, in Carter'sInsuranceAgency v. Franklin,57 on rehearing acknowledged that W. K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v.
Meriwether Supply Co. and Fidelity National Bank v. Pitchford had been

55. Renshaw v. Richards, 30 La. Ann. 398 (Orl. 1878); e.g., American Gen. Inv. Corp.
v. St. Elmo Lands, 391 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 395 So. 2d
682 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Doni Homes, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
56. 426 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
57. 428 So. 2d 808 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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overruled by Leenerts Farms and inquired into the reasonableness of
twenty-five percent attorney's fees, but in view of the relatively small
balances on the promissory notes, the court concluded twenty-five percent was reasonable.
In Reynolds, Nelson, Theriot & Stahl v. Chatelain," the fifth circuit
found an oral contract between the client and the attorney even though
no hourly rate had been specified or agreed upon. After the work was
completed, the attorney sent a bill based on a rate of seventy dollars per
hour, and when that was not paid, he sent a second bill revised upward
wherein he calculated his rate at one hundred dollars per hour. The trial
court found that seventy dollars per hour was not an "unconscionable
fee" but that the amount of the second bill was arbitrary, and there was
no agreement permitting the increase of the hourly rate upon nonpayment of the first bill. The fifth circuit affirmed, reiterating the rule that
the fee agreed to may not be excessive and is subject to scrutiny. It is
a little difficult to justify the court's holding that an oral contract rather
than quantum meruit was involved, but the court said that in a situation
in which the client employs the attorney for professional services and the
amount or the measure of the lawyer's fee is not especially agreed upon,
there is an implied promise to pay the value of those services.
The Reynolds decision introduces very well Succession of D'Antoni,"
wherein the attorney was named in the will of the decedent as the attorney for the estate, but the will did not contain any provisions for a
fee and there was no evidence that the decedent and the attorney had
ever agreed upon any particular fee. The court said that under such circumstances it is presumed in law that the parties intended payment of
a reasonable fee, and under the jurisprudence appropriate attorney's fees
in the administration of a succession depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A rate of one hundred dollars per hour was
found by the trial court to be reasonable, and this finding was affirmed
on appeal.
There are several other fee cases which the writer would like to address briefly. Succession of Boyenga, 0 now pending in the Louisiana
Supreme Court, is a case which should make every lawyer sit up and
take notice. Dr. Boyenga had named attorney Samuel P. Love as the attorney to represent Dr. Boyenga's executrix in his last will. However, prior
to his death, Dr. Boyenga had consulted with another attorney concerning changing the will and in particular changing the attorney named to
represent the estate. But, before the second will could be signed, Dr.
Boyenga died. Thereafter, Mr. Love was asked to renounce any right that
58.
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he might have to serve as the attorney for Dr. Boyenga's succession, but
he refused. Mrs. Boyenga, as the testamentary executrix, then filed a petition for probate of Dr. Boyenga's will and at the same time asked for
the removal of Mr. Love as the attorney designated to represent the estate.
Mr. Love answered the rule to remove him and further filed a reconventional demand seeking a fee of two and one-half percent of the gross
estate in the event of his removal as compensation for services which he
would otherwise have rendered to the estate.
The trial court removed Mr. Love as attorney for the succession on
the basis that the executrix was not bound to accept his services and
awarded him a fee of two and one-half percent of the gross assets of
the succession. The executrix appealed but Mr. Love did not. This was
a serious mistake on Love's part because the second circuit was faced
only with the question of whether Mr. Love could collect an "unearned"
fee and was without power to reinstate him as attorney for the succession. First, the second circuit held that under existing law and jurisprudence
a testator may not orally revoke a prior designation of an attorney for
his estate in a will, and consequently that Dr. Boyenga's stated intention
to remove Mr. Love was insufficient. The executrix argued that Rivet v.
Battistella6' and the other cases holding that the designation of an attorney in a will is in the nature of a legacy 2 had been overruled by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which has been determined to be
a part of the substantive law of Louisiana. The court agreed and held
that under the facts and circumstances of the case, an award to Mr. Love
of two and one-half percent of the gross value of the assets would constitute an unearned fee clearly prohibited by the law of Louisiana, citing
disciplinary rule 2-106 and Saucier.
It will be interesting to see what the Louisiana Supreme Court does
with this case, not only concerning the fee but also the issue of whether
an attorney named by a testator enjoys an irrevocable status in that he
may not be discharged without his consent except for cause. To hold that
the attorney does enjoy such a status simply does not seem consistent
with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Fontenot & Mitchell v. Rozas, Manuel, Fontenot & McGee," two
law firms had been hired by the same client to work on the same personal injury law suit with nothing said in the written contract concerning
how the two law firms were to split the fee, which was to be a total
of one-third of the amount recovered. One law firm consisted of two
partners, and the other consisted of four partners. Inasmuch as the two
firms could not agree as to how the fee was to be split, suit was instituted.
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The larger firm, of course, contended that the fee should be divided by
heads so that the two-man law firm would receive only two-sixths of the
fee and the four-member law firm would receive four-sixths of the fee.
The smaller law firm contended that the fee should be split equally, with
one-half of the fee going to each firm. Initially, the third circuit found
that quantum meruit did not apply since neither law firm had been
discharged at any stage of the proceedings and both firms worked
throughout. Further, the couit found that disciplinary rule 2-107 concerning the division of fees among lawyers was not applicable because the
rule is aimed at full disclosure to the client by his attorney that another
lawyer has been associated by the lawyer and will be sharing in the fee.
The court concluded that the client had retained the services of two law
firms rather than six individuals and affirmed the dividing of the fee on
a fifty-fifty basis.
The fifth circuit considered the question of whether an attorney could
charge a client to correct a mistake which the attorney had committed.
In Farris v. Lamont, 6" a judgment adverse to the client in a domestic
proceeding was rendered because of a misunderstanding between the attorney's law partner, who was standing in for the attorney, and opposing
counsel. The erroneous judgment then had to be corrected and a number
of court appearances were required in order to rectify the matter. The
attorney then billed his client for approximately $1,300 for the time involved in corrective work. The court wrote:
Basically, it comes to this: The plaintiff as an attorney was hired
by the defendant to perform specific professional services, which
he performed in such a manner as to subsequently require substantial remedial services to correct his errors. Should a lawyer be
allowed to profit by his own mistakes at the expense of his innocent client? The obvious answer is no.
The doctrine of equity is founded in the Christian principle not
to do unto others that which we would not wish others to do
unto us.6"
An earlier section of this article discussed prescription of a malpractice action. In Julien v. Wayne," the first circuit was confronted with
the length of the prescriptive period when a client is suing to recover for
an over-payment of fees. The plaintiff contended that the action prescribed
in ten years under Civil Code article 3544 governing personal actions, but
the attorney contended and the lower court found that the three-year
prescriptive period of article 3538 applied. In spite of the argument by
the attorney that it would be exceedingly burdensome to have to main64.
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tain files for ten years, the court found article 3544's ten-year period to
be the applicable prescriptive period on a claim for restitution under Civil
Code article 2301.
CONCLUSION

This article does not attempt to cover each and every case involving
professional responsibility, but covers those cases which the writer deems
to be of the most interest and importance. One wonders if the Leenerts
Farms case will spur litigation every time a client gets a bill from an attorney. This possibility will not only be disagreeable to the attorney but
will probably cause him much expense, given the additional time required
to collect the fee as well as the tendency of judges as a group to be quite
conservative when setting attorneys' fees.
Even more intriguing is the question of whether the Code of Professional Responsibility should displace the Civil Code articles on obligations where attorneys' fees are concerned. The thesis of several commentators is that the Code of Professional Responsibility is substantive law
to be followed by all lawyers, not by the courts in deciding disputes.6 1
John F. Sutton, Jr. argues that the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility were never intended to be used as procedural rules
in litigation, but were designed only as regulatory rules to be enforced
in disciplinary proceedings. 68 There is much to be said for this view.
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